Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 2

Article 3

February 1931

Testamentary Provisions against Contest
Charles H. Edwards

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles H. Edwards, Testamentary Provisions against Contest, 9 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 97 (1931).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol9/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS AGAINST
CONTEST
CHAR1.ES

H.

EDWARDS'

THE law of the United States says, in effect, .that a
man while living may, subject to the sovereignty of
the state, own property and direct how it shall be divided
and distributed after his death. This right is said by the
majority of jurisdictions not to be a so-called natural
or inherent right protected by the Constitution 2 but
purely a statutory right.8 Wisconsin on the contrary
holds that the right to make a will or testament is an
inherent right guaranteed by the constitution in the
following language:
[The right to make a will] is not a mere privilege which
legislatures can directly or unreasonably regulate or destroy.
It is not an incident of the possession of property which courts
can deal with in any spirit of mere discretion. It is a right,
absolute, which every person of mature mind and disposing
memory may exercise, subject to some regulations to prevent
4
abuse of it and to safeguard it, as he sees fit.

This power to make a will belongs to the donor or
testator and to no one else-not even the court or jury.5
The right may be exercised as the testator sees fit, limited only by the statute.6 It is within the exercise of
this right that testators have drafted into their wills and
testaments conditions, including the testamentary condition against contest.
Conditions are of two classes, either conditions precedent or conditions subsequent. The terms are selfI Li. M. Assistant Trust-officer and counsel, Merchant's National
Bank, Aurora, Ill.
2 Buerger v. Buerger, 317 Ill. 401.
3 Selden v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 239 Ill. 67.
4 Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190.
5 In re Wilson's Estate, 117 Cal. 262, and citations there given.
6 Pearce v. Pearce, 199 Ala. 491; Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243;
McCommon et al. v. McCommon et al., 151 Ill. 428.
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explanatory-the conditon precedent precedes the estate,
and no interest or title passes until the condition is satisfied;7 the condition subsequent, after the interest or
title has passed, works a defeasance 5 To ascertain into
which of these two classes a condition falls, it is necessary to examine the statement of the condition and to
ascertain therefrom, or from the context of the entire
will, the intention of the testator. A testamentary condition against contest may be of either class.
Thus, one testator in his will directs that should any
one or more of the beneficiaries named in the will object
to the distribution as made or attempt to defeat the
provisions of the will such person or persons shall receive
the sum of five dollars each and no more. 9 Another
declares that, to the end there be no wasting of his estate
by litigation, it is his will that any provisions made in
favor of his wife or any of his children should, as to
his wife or children, be null and void in the event any
of them should present any claim against his estate or
in any way contest the probate or operation of his will;
and a gift over is provided in event such condition is violated. 10 Another provides that if his wife or any of his
children should contest his will by objecting to its probate or try to break it, such one or ones should not
receive the amounts therein given them."
In construing such provisions, a question of first importance is what is meant by a contest. It was said in
Wright et al. v. Cummins et al., 1 2 "The prohibition does
not mean to prevent the assertion of legal rights not
amounting to a denial of the will." In Harber v. Uarber
7 Maquire

v. City of Macomb, 293

111. 441;

Cronin v.

Cronin, 314

I1n. 345.
s Whiting's Appeal, 67 Conn. 379.
9In re Bergland's Estate, 180 Cal. 629.
10 South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John et al., 92 Conn. 168.
11 Harber v. Harber et al., 158 Ga. 274.
See also Moran v. Moran,
144 Ia. 451; Wright et al. v. Cummins et al., 108 Kan. 667, where
gifts over were made in the event the beneficiaries contested the
will.
12 108 Kan. 667.
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et al.,13 it was held that asserting a right of dower was
not a contest, since that did not amount to denying the
will. In In re Bergland's Estate,1 4 it was held that the
offer of a later will to probate was not a contest within
the provisions of the condition.
These decisions seem clearly to define the word contest
as the doing of some act derogatory to the will and
tending to set it at naught with respect to some provisions or to its entirety. Acts collaterally or incidentally
affecting the will but which do not deny its sufficiency
or operation are not contests.
Testators more and more are inserting conditions
against contest in their wills and it is logical to assume
that one of two motives induce such a provision: first,
to deter litigation over the will and prevent dissipation
of the estate through the expense of such litigation; second, to prevent the scandal and publicity incident to
every will contest.
At early times such provisions were denied effect and
treated as invalid, 15 the reason assigned by the court
being that such a condition was contrary to public policy.
At the present time, however, the condition is almost
universally held to be valid and given full force and
effect. In the case of Donegqan v. Wade 16 the court sustained such a condition, saying,
The testator had a right to dispose of his property as he saw
fit so long as he violated no law or established principle of

sound public policy. He could make such distribution on condition subsequent or precedent not illegal. Such contests often
breed irreconcilable family feuds and lead to disgraceful family
exposures-they not unfrequently, too, waste away vast estates
by extravagant and protracted litigation.
13 158 Ga. 274.
See also Wright et al. v. Cummins et al., 108 Kan.
667, where filing a claim against the estate was held not to be a

contest.
14 180 Cal. 629.
15 In re Keenan's Will, 188 Wis. 163.
6 Rich. Eq.. 12.
16 70 Ala. 501.

See also Mallet v. Smith,
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In this case, the brother aided and abetted the sister in
a contest of the will and then denied that the condition
applied to him. The court held him barred from the
beneficence by the condition, because, "to relieve him
would put a premium on artifice."
The courts of California have consistently and with
insistence held such conditions valid. They have said:
It is to be observed that a condition such as this, not only does
no violence to public policy, but meets with the approval of that
policy. Public policy dictates that the courts of the land should
be open, upon even terms, to all suitors. But this does not
mean that it invites litigation. To the contrary, it deplores
litigation. 17 Appellant's principal contention is that there was
no forfeiture in this case for the reason that she had probable
ground for contest
* *. No such exception is stated in
the contest provision contained in the will, and we know of
no principle that authorizes us to declare it. To do so would
be to substitute our own views for a clearly expressed intent of
the testator to the contrary.18

In Cooke v. Turner 19 such a condition was held valid
by the English court in the following language:
In the case of a condition such as that before us, the state has
no interest whatever apart from the interest of the parties themselves. There is no duty, either perfect or imperfect, on the
part of an heir to contest his ancestor's sanity. It matters
not to the state whether the land is enjoyed by the heir or by
the devisee; and we conceive, therefore, that the law leaves
parties to make just what contracts and engagements they think
expedient.

If the condition be precedent the court says the question
could not arise since there could be no gift until the condition was first satisfied.
re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436.
IS In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119. See also In re Mann, 192 Cal.
393; In re Bergland's Estate, 180 Cal. 629; In re Garcelon's Estate,
104 Cal. 570.
19 14 Sim. 493.
17In
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The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Iowa hold such condition valid by the adoption
of the following extremely strong language:
The propositions thus laid down [in conditional clauses against
contest] fully commend themselves to our approval. They are
good law and good morals. Experience has shown that often
after the death of a testator unexpected difficulties arise, technical rules of law are found to have been trespassed upon,
contests are commenced, .
.
and as a result the manifest
intention of the testator is thwarted. It is not strange, in
view of this, that testators have desired to secure compliance
with their dispositions of property and have sought to incorporate provisions which should operate most powerfully to
accomplish that result. And when a testator declares in his
will that his several bequests are made upon the condition that
the legatees acquiesce in the provisions of his will, the courts
wisely hold that no legatees shall without compliance with that
condition receive his bounty, or be put in a position to use it
20
in the effort to thwart his expressed purposes.
For ourselves we cannot believe that public interests are in
any manner prejudiced or the fundamental rights of any individual citizen in any manner violated by upholding a gift or
bequest made on condition that the donee waive or release his
claim to some other property right, or even upon condition
that he observe some specified line of personal conduct not in
violation of law, or contrary to good morals. The donee is
under no compulsion to accept the gift. He is free to elect. The
question he has to decide is the ordinary one which arises in
nearly every business transaction-whether the thing offered
him is worth the price demanded. The owner of property may
give or refrain from giving. He may attach to its offer such
lawful conditions as his reason, caprice, or malice may dictate,
but he is dealing with his own, and the donee, who claims the
benefit of the gift, must take it, if at all, upon the terms
21
offered.
20 Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398.
21 Moran v. Moran, 144 Ia. 451. See also Bradford v. Bradford, 19
Ohio St. 546; Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N. J. Eq. 388; Whitehurst v. Gotwalt,
189 N. C. 577; Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137; In re Barandon's Estate,
84 N. Y. Supp. 937; In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436; Massie v.
Massie, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 617; Schiffer v. Brenton, 247 Mich. 512;
In re Chambers' Estate, 322 Mo. 1086; Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin,
312 Ill. 318.
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Still, in spite of this strong tendency towards holding
the conditions valid, some jurisdictions, while otherwise
holding them valid, will set the conditions for naught by
saying they contravene public policy.
In South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John et al.,22 the
court, while holding the condition valid, said: "The law
provides who may make a will and how it shall be made.
Courts cannot know whether a will, good on its
face, was made in conformity to statutory requirements,
whether the testator was of sound mind,

.

.

.

unless

these matters are presented in court. And those only
who have an interest in the will will have the disposition
to lay the facts before the court." Then they say, in
effect, if there is good faith and probable cause, public
policy would prohibit enforcement of the condition.
Some Courts hold that the conditions are against the
"liberty of the law." The theory of such holding is
expressed in the personal opinion of Chancellor Wardlaw in Mallett v. Smith23 in the following language: "A
condition subsequent of this description is void, whether'
there be a devise over or not, as trenching on the liberty
of the law,

.

.

and violating public policy.

It is

the interest of the state that every legal owner should
enjoy his estate, and that no citizen should be obstructed
by risk of forfeiture from asserting his right by the law
of the land."
It is also held that these conditions are not operative
if there be good faith and probable cause. This is stated
by Mr. Justice Brown in In re Friend'sEstate24 :
It is not to be questioned that it was competent for the testatrix, possessing the absolute power to dispose of what she
possessed just as she pleased, to impose the condition upon
which the appellants rely in asking that their brother shall be
deprived of all interest in her estate; and it is equally clear,
22 92 Conn. 168.
23 6 Rich. Eq. 12.
See also Fifield v. Van Wyck's Executor, 94 Va.
557, where the court holds such conditions are merely in terrorem

and inoperative.
24 209 Pa. 442.

See also Rouse v. Branch, 91 S. C. 111.
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in view of his attempt to annul her will, that the burden is
upon him to show that he now ought to have what it gives him.
Such conditions to testamentary gifts and devises are universally
recognized as valid, and, by some courts, enforceable without
exception. The better rule, however, seems to us to be that
the penalty of forfeiture of the gift or devise ought not be
imposed when it clearly appears that the contest to have the
will set aside was justified under the circumstances, and was not
the mere vexatious act of a disappointed child or next of kin.
A different rule-and unbending one-that in no case shall an
unsuccessful contestant of a will escape the penalty of forfeiture of the interest given him, would sometimes not only work
manifest injustice, but would accomplish results that no rational
testator would ever contemplate. This is manifest from a
moment's reflection, and is illustrated by the class of cases to
which the one now before us belongs, in which there is an allegation of undue influence which procured the execution of the
will. If, as a matter of fact, undue influence is successfully
exerted over one about to execute a will, that same influence
will have written into it a clause which will make sure its disposition of the alleged testator's property. He who will take
advantage of his power to unduly influence another in the execution of a will, will artfully have a care to have inserted in it
a clause to shut off all inquiry as to the influence which really
made the will; and, if the rule invoked by the appellants is to
be applied with no case excepted from it, those who unscrupulously play upon the feelings of the testator may, with impunity,
enjoy the fruits of their iniquity, and laugh in scorn at those
whom they have wronged.

Other courts make an exception if the gift is of personalty and there is no gift over on breach of the condition although they hold the condition otherwise valid
and no estate over necessary as to realty. 25 This doctrine is thoroughly discussed in In re Hite,26 and this
25 Green v. Old People's Home, 269
19 Ohio St. 546; Morris v. Burroughs,
et al., 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 670; In re
Fifield v. Van Wyck's Executor, 94 Va.
26 155 Cal. 436.

Ill. 134; Bradford v. Bradford,
1 Atk. 399; Pray et al. v. Belt
White's Estate, 163 Pa. 388;
557.
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distinction between realty and personalty repudiated
very aptly. Here the court says:
It is recognized that a forfeiture of land devised will result,
under such circumstances [condition against contest], without
a specific devise over. That decisions in abundance may be
found holding that the same rule does not apply in cases of
legacy is an anomaly of the law of wills. It rests upon no
substantial distinction, and, where recognized, it is adopted in
deference to the weight of earlier adjudications. It was not
a part of the common law as such, but came to be recognized in
England by the chancery courts to preserve uniformity, since
legacies could be sued for and recovered in the ecclesiastical
courts, which followed the rule of the civil law. By the civil
law, the fiction was introduced that, unless there was a gift
over of such legacy, a forfeiture would not be decreed ....
We are not embarrassed in its consideration by any adjudication
of our own, and are at liberty to decide in accordance with
sound reason. If it be that the rule anciently rested for its
support upon the doctrine of public policy, we find, even in
England, where the rule prevails, that such support has been
withdrawn. If it rests, as it seems to have rested in England,
upon the desire of the chancery court to conform to the decisions of the ecclesiastical court, such a reason does not in this
state, obtain. In brief, no reason can be found why such a
rule, founded neither upon public policy, nor dictates of the
common law, should by us be given recognition.

It has been held, following these decisions, that a general residuary clause is no such gift over unless there
27
is an express provision to that effect.
The next exception we find being applied by the courts
on the rule of the validity of the condition is where the
suit is by a minor. In Bryant v. Thompson 2s it was held
that on grounds of public policy the conditions was inapplicable to minors.
In our opinion, however, the better way to reach the
same result was devised by the court in Moorman v.
27 Fifield v. Van Wyck's Executor, 94 Va. 557.
28 59 Hun. 545.
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Louisville Trust Co. et al.2 9 Here the court held the rule
applicable to minors, but since a minor is due the protection of a court of equity, the court in its discretion dismissed the suit thereby preventing the contest and the
subsequent forfeiture, and said in effect that the right
would still be with the minor when it reached majority.'
Thereafter the minor could make its own election on the
condition and sue if it wished. The only objection that
could be offered to such a holding would be that the
evidence would be dissipated within that period, yet this
is not a substantial objection, since our practice offers
adequate methods whereby evidence may be preserved.
From these authorities we see plainly that there is
no conclusive uniformity among the decisions. This
justifies us in stating our own views. We are of the
opinion that the testamentary conditions against contest
should be held valid and operative without exception
and that any violation by any one should effect the forfeiture absolutely:
First, because the property passes as a gift without
consideration and the right of ownership should imply a
right of unqualified disposition-a disposition with or
without condition, unless the condition attached be immoral or derogatory to some actual rather than fictitious
rule of public policy. In our brief examination of the
historic development of this subject we found that the
position of wills strengthened with the strengthening of
the right of private ownership. This should continue.
Private ownership in this country is our most cherished
fundamental right. Any limitation placed upon the right
of conditions is an infringement of the right of private
ownership and private disposition of property. The will
is the owner's last contract-his final dealings with man.
In consideration of this question, we must appreciate
that every state by positive legislation saves to the surviving spouse inherent rights of property which no
condition can contravene. Some states by express enact29 181 Ky. 30.
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ment give certain statutory rights in property to children
which cannot either be contravened by will or testament,
such as a child's award, interest to children by a former
marriage, and the like. Where the state has some particular interest in distributing property to certain individuals this is or should be expressed in statutes and if
not so expressed the courts should not assume to determine such a question on the hypothesis of public policy.
Second, the owner of property can, during his life, do
with his property as he pleases. He may sell, give away
under any legal conditions, destroy, (if in so doing he
does no actual or threatened injury to the property of
another), barter, trade, convey, etc., as his caprice, desire,
or malice may direct. This is an inalienable right connected with ownership. There is no logical reason in
equity or good conscience why this right should not also
exist by will or testament. As in the case of wills, so
in the case of deeds, does the law provide the mode and
method of execution and the capacity of parties. These
satisfied, the deed may be on any condition not violating
a positive law. Why not also a like rule with respect
to wills?
Third, on the authorities of other conditions in wills
the condition against contest should be sustained. It has
been held "the fact that the will is unjust and unnatural
does not render it invalid.'"', Conditions that the beneficiary support some one are universally held valid, as
are conditions to render specified personal service and to
pay stipulated expenses.
Conditions with reference to the conduct of the recipient of the bounty are held valid in the following cases:
Settles down and marries, reforms from intemperate
habits ;31 refrains from the use of intoxicating liquors
and tobacco ;32 demonstrates good habits and business
capacity ;33 proves to be good moral character ;34 that the
3o
31
32
33

Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26; Cunniff v. Cunniff, 255 Ill. 407.
Cassem v. Kennedy et al., 147 Ill. 660.
Holmes v. Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 92 Conn. 507.
Campbell v. Clough, 71 N. H. 181.
34 Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366.
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devisee5 do not present any claim against devisor's
3
estate.
'While it is true that conditions in wills in general
restraint of marriage are held invalid, still conditions
in limited restraint of marriage are uniformly sustained.
The same rule is also applicable to conditions in restraint
of alienation and use and occupancy of realty. Behind
this rule there exists an actual public interest or concern.
Marriage is not only a legal but also a social and spiritual
institution. Upon it depends to a tremendous extent the
public morals and welfare of society. It is ruled, regulated, and governed by extensive and intricate legislative
acts; not so with descent or distribution of property.
There is no general or specific public concern involved
in whether one or another legatee, heir-at-law, or next
of kin receives the testator's bounty.
With respect to alienation, use or occupancy, of property there is a general public concern. The free transmission of property is the foundation of our present
economic structure. Laws and decrees are numerous to
prevent defeat of free alienation. Every public concern
in such matters is codified in decisions or acts. The
testamentary condition against contest has no relation
to our economic structure. Such conditions cannot impair the state's economic well-being.
Conditions with respect to religious belief have been,
with some exceptions, held valid. In Hodgson v. Halford3 6 a condition that the gift should fail if legatee
abandoned the Jewish .religion was held valid. In In re
May3 7 and Lasnier v. Martin"5 similar conditions were
enforced also to the same effect.
Such conditions could more logically be held to contravene public policy than the condition against contest,
particularly in the United States, where the right of
35 Rogers v. Law, 66 U. S. (1 Black) 253.
36 11 L. R. Ch. Div. 959.
37 [19171

2 Ch. Div. 126.

38 102 Kan. 551; see Barnum et al. v. Mayor of Baltimore et al.,
62 Md. 275.
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freedom of religious worship is a fundamental and constitutional right. Yet the courts seem to incline to the
view that the election here belongs to the beneficiary, and
if he accepts the bounty, he does so subject to the price
assessed by the testator.
Fourth, we cannot see where the condition contravenes
the "liberty of the law." The right of contest remains
although there is a premium placed upon its exercise.
He who desires may disregard the condition and assert
his right of suit. It would be impracticable to assume
that any one would instigate a contest unless he were to
obtain some gain if such suit succeeded. What then is
the problem confronting the legatee, beneficiary, or
devisee? Logically it is, "Shall I take what is offered
or shall I strive for more?" Is not a testator justified
in an attempt to stifle such a mercenary attitude toward
his bounty? Is it not better thus than for the testator
in effect to say "I offer you this, but if you contest, and
although by doing so, slander my name and that of my
family as well as belittle my character, if you can win
more, I shall furnish the funds for you and place no
obstacle in your way."
What can be this fictitious something, abstract as it
must be, called "good faith and probable cause?" Are
not good faith and probable cause those elements, which,
when found, are only the ingredients of a successful
litigation?

